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Callahan),
Petitioner/Appellant,
v.

]
]
]

WILLIAM K. CALLAHAN,

]
)
;)

Supreme Court No.: 20000028
Court of Appeals Case No. 990051-CA

Respondent/Appellee.

])

Priority 15

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
Review should be denied in this matter as no substantial
question is presented to challenge existing law.
1.

As the ruling of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter, based on Toone v.

Toone. 1998 UT App. 952 P.2d 112 and Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 1988 Utah Ct.
App. 767 P.2d 121 simply followed the ruling of this court in Despain v. Despain. 1981
Utah, 627 P.2d 526, no new question of law is presented and the Petitioner for Certiorari
should be denied.
2.

The Utah Court of Appeals determination that the trial court correctly ruled

4

that there was no factual change of circumstances is not only a correct ruling based on the
facts of this case but is consistent with the ruling of this court in Despain v. Despain.
1981 Utah, 627 P.2d 526, that when the parties enter into a stipulated divorce, a change in
the law is not a change in circumstances upon which a trial court may re-open and modify
the decree of divorce.
Reference to official and unofficial reports of any opinions issued by the Court of
Appeals
1.

The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter is reported as

Childs v. Callahan. 1999 UT App., 359, 384 Utah Adv. Rep. 3.
Statement of the Grounds upon Which Jurisdiction of Supreme Court is Invoked
The Utah Court of Appeals entered its opinion on December 9, 1999.
1.

There have been no orders respecting either a rehearing or an extension of

time in this matter.
2.

There is no reliance made upon Rule 47(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure, as this is not a cross-petition.
3.

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code

Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(a) 1953, as amended. This Writ of Certiorari is sought in order to
review disposing of the mutual claims of the Petitioner.
Controlling and Determinative Authorities
§ 30-3-5 of the Utah Code.

5

Despain v. Despain, 1981 UT 627 P.2d 526
A.

Nature of the Case. Respondent accepts Petitioner's statement of the case.

ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
First Issue
While Petitioner presents a substantial argument dealing with the "gap period" in
fact, this case presents no new issue of law which has not been resolved by the courts of
this State. In this Court's decision of Despain v. Despain 1981 UT 627 P.2d 526, this
court ruled, when Dr. Despain returned to Court seeking modification of his child support
based on a change in the law, that a change of law is not a change in circumstances upon
which a stipulated decree of divorce can be re-opened and modified. The fact that Dr.
Despain9 s daughter had attained the age of twenty-one (21) and subsequent decisions
established the courts could not order him to send her to college or support her beyond the
age of twenty-one (21) presented no factual basis for the modification of a decree of
divorce which was based on the stipulation of the parties.
The Court of Appeals has followed that authority in this case Childs v. Callahan,
1999 UT App. 359, 384 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 f s 9, 11-14.
Toone v. Toone, 1998 UT App. 952 P.2d 112 and Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 1988
UTApp.767P.2dl21.
The claim asserted by the Petitioner that the Respondent has now acquired military
retirement benefits which did not exist at the time of the divorce is a factual change of

6

circumstances is not correct. Analysis of this claim reveals that it could not have been
asserted without a change in the law occurring after the entry of the Decree of Divorce.
Appellant admits the law in effect as well as the factual circumstance before the Court at
the time of the entry of the stipulated Decree of Divorce precluded an award to her of any
of Respondent' military retirement benefits. Only a change in the law givers her a right to
even assert the claim she now presents to the Court.
If Respondent now has acquired a military retirement benefit, any claim of the
Petitioner to that benefit is based upon a change in the federal law occurring after entry of
the decree. In essence, the Petitioner now requests this Court to re-evaluate the long
settled rule in Utah law that a claim based on a change in the law is not a change of
circumstances upon which to re-open and modify a decree of divorce. Respondent
believes no reason for re-evaluation of that law is presented in this case. Just as the trial
court correctly granted Appellee's Motion to Dismiss, The Petition for Certiorari should
be denied.
CONCLUSION
No new question of law is presented and no valid reason for reason for
reevaluating a established long standing rule of Utah law is presented by Petitioner. The
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals and the trial court before it represent clear
applications of Utah law which should simply be affirmed by denial of Petitioner's
request for a Petition for Certiorari.
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DATED this _ ^

day of February, 2000.

COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing RESPONSE TO
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, to the following individuals at the address shown, via
First Class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on this
day of February, 2000:
Neil B. Crist
Leonard E. McGee
Attorneys for Appellant
380 North, 200 West, #260
Bountiful, UT 84010
\
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This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS

00O00

Diana Childs fka Diane
Callahan,

OPINION
(For Official Publication)

Petitioner and Appellant,

Case No. 990051-CA

v.

F I L E D
(December 9, 1999)

William K. Callahan,

» 1999 UT App 359

Respondent and Appellee.

Second District, Ogden Department
The Honorable Roger S. Dutson
Attorneys:

Leonard E. McGee and Neil B. Crist, Bountiful, for
Petitioner
David S. Dolowitz, Salt Lake City, for Respondent

Before Judges Wilkins, Billings, and Davis.
WILKINS, Presiding Judge:
Hi
Diana Childs appeals from an order denying her request for
modification of a divorce decree to permit her to share in
William Callahan's military retirement pay. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
%2
Childs and Callahan were married in March 1965, and had two
children during the course of their marriage. In 1966 Callahan
joined the military on a full-time basis. In 1979, after nearly
thirteen years of active duty, Callahan left the military.
H3
In June 1981, the United States Supreme Court decided
McCartv v. McCartv, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S. Ct. 2728 (1981), holding
that federal law precluded state courts from dividing military
retirement benefits under state community property laws.
However, in 1982, Congress enacted the Uniformed Services Former
Spouses1 Protection Act (USFSPA), 10 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1408 (amended
1990), to address the McCarty decision. USFSPA permits the
former spouse of a military service member to receive up to fifty

percent of the service member's retirement benefits. See id. §
1408(c) (1) . USFSPA became effective in 1983, and affords
individuals who were divorced between June 26, 1981 and February
1, 1983 (the McCarty gap), the opportunity to return to court for
the purpose of claiming a share in their former spouse's military
retirement benefits.
H4
The parties in this case were divorced in March 1982 and
therefore, fall squarely within the McCarty gap. However, at the
time of the divorce, Callahan was ineligible for military
retirement benefits because he had accumulated only thirteen
years of creditable military service. In order to qualify for
retirement benefits, the military requires its members to
accumulate at least twenty years of creditable military service,
either through full-time active duty service or part-time reserve
service.
il5
In 1984, Childs issued a subpoena to Callahan inquiring
about his income, including his "military reserve service."
Thereafter, Childs filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of
Divorce, requesting an order increasing Callahan's child support
obligation which the trial court ultimately granted. Sometime
after the divorce was finalized, Callahan re-affiliated with the
military reserves. Childs alleges that Callahan became eligible
to qualify for military retirement benefits by including the
thirteen years he served while the parties were married with the
time he spent in the reserves after the parties divorced.
K6
In January 1998, Childs read an article that led her to
believe that she may be entitled to one-half of Callahan's
military retirement benefits which accrued during the parties'
marriage. After reading the article, Childs contacted an
attorney to represent her in this matter. In April 1998, more
than sixteen years after the divorce was finalized, Childs filed
a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce, claiming she had only
recently discovered she was entitled to a share of Callahan's
military retirement. Childs asserted that the enactment of.the
USFSPA, which nullified McCartv, now entitled her to a share of
Callahan!s military retirement benefits.
1(7
Callahan filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the
subsequent legal recognition of pension benefits as marital
property is not a substantial change of circumstances that would
justify reopening the parties1 divorce decree. The trial court
agreed and granted Callahan's motion on the basis that "a change
in law is not enough to constitute a substantial change of
circumstances justifying the reopening of a decree of divorce."
The trial court further concluded that Childs had failed to
demonstrate a factual change in circumstances that would warrant
a modification of the decree. Callahan subsequently requested
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attorney fees on the basis that Childs's claims were without
merit and asserted in bad faith. The trial court denied
Callahan's fee request. This appeal followed.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
f8
We address two issues on appeal. First, we consider
whether the trial court erred in holding there had been no
substantial change of circumstances sufficient to justify
reopening the divorce decree. Second, we address whether the
trial court erred in denying Callahan's request for attorney
fees. Because both claims are questions of law, we review them
under a correction of error standard, giving no deference to the
trial court. See Toone v. Toone. 952 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998) (stating whether a divorce decree should be reopened
to divide a military pension is a question of law) ; Selvacre v.
J.J. Johnson & Assocs., 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
("Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a
question of law, which is reviewed for correctness.").
ANALYSIS
I.

Military Retirement Benefits

1|9
Childs argues that she is entitled to a modification of the
parties' divorce decree because: (1) USFSPA was enacted in order
to allow a former spouse of a military service member to receive
a portion of the service member's retirement benefits; and (2)
the vesting of Callahan's military retirement benefits
constitutes a substantial change in circumstances which justifies
a modification of the divorce decree. We disagree.
A.

Change in Law

HlO Childs first argues that she is entitled to a share of
Callahan's military retirement benefits under USFSPA because
Callahan accumulated a portion of his benefits during the
parties' marriage and their divorce occurred during the McCarty
gap. However, this argument alone does not support Childs's
request for modification of the divorce decree. In order to
justify a change or modification of the original divorce decree,
Childs must demonstrate that "a substantial change in
circumstances has occurred since the entry of the decree."
Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985) (citations
omitted) .
Ull In the present case, Childs has failed to show how the
change in law from McCarty to USFSPA constitutes a substantial
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change in circumstances. Indeed, this court recently held that
passage of USFSPA does not constitute a substantial change of
circumstances that would allow a former wife to reopen a divorce
decree and obtain a share of her former husbandfs military
retirement benefits. See Toone, 952 P.2d at 114; see also
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P. 2d 121, 124 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) (stating "legal recognition of a new category of property
rights after a divorce decree has been entered, is not itself
sufficient to establish a substantial change of circumstances
justifying a revaluation of a prior property division") . Thus,
although the parties' divorce was granted in the McCarty gap, and
could have been reconsidered under USFSPA, the trial court was
correct in granting Callahan's motion to dismiss in the absence
of a showing of a material change of circumstances,
B.

Change in Factual Circumstances

1l2 Childs further argues that the vesting of Callahan's
military retirement benefits is a sufficient factual change of
circumstances to justify modification of the divorce decree. We
disagree.
Kl3 In this case, the trial court reviewed the "purported
factual changes, construing them most favorably to [Childs] , and
did not find any material change of circumstances, even by
including consideration of the changes in law jointly with other
material facts that had occurred between 1982 and 1998." In
fact, the trial court specifically found that Childs "presented
no evidence of a substantial change in circumstances factually."
The trial court's factual findings underlying its conclusion that
there was no material change of circumstances are entitled to
deference. See Shioii v. Shioii, 712 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1985)
(stating "[i]n divorce proceedings . . . the trial court is
accorded particularly broad discretion"). Because these factual
findings support the conclusion that no material change of
circumstances existed, we affirm the trial court's decision on
this issue.
Hl4 Furthermore, public policy supports the trial court's denial
of Childs's request for modification of the divorce decree.
Under Utah law there is a "compelling policy interest favoring
the finality of property settlements." Toone, 952 P.2d at 114
(citations omitted); see also Bailev v. Bailev. 745 P.2d 830, 832
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (stating "potential for long lasting
financial entanglement is a valid concern in divorce cases").
Although the right to seek modification of a divorce decree is
well settled in Utah, the finality of property settlements is a
counter-balancing interest that must be considered. Such
considerations will be highly fact intensive and must be examined
on a case-by-case basis.
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Ul5 Here, more than thirteen years had passed since the last
hearing on the parties' divorce decree. The trial court found
that Childs was "aware that [Callahan] was actively involved in
the military reserves as early as 1984." Although Childs did not
learn of her potential entitlement to Callahan's retirement
benefits until 1998, the length of time that has passed since the
parties1 divorce weighs heavily in favor of denying Childsfs
request for modification. We therefore affirm the trial court's
order with respect to retirement benefits.
II.

Attorney Fees

Kl6 Finally, Callahan asks this court to award him attorney feesand costs incurred at trial and on appeal.1 Under section 78-2756, attorney fees may be awarded if the court determines that an
action is meritless and brought in bad faith. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-56 (1996) . In order to find that a party acted in bad
faith, the trial court must determine that at least one of the
following factors existed: (i) The party lacked an honest belief
in the propriety of the activities in question; (ii) the party
intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) the
party intended to or acted with the knowledge that the activities
in question would hinder, delay, or defraud others. See Cady v.
Johnson. 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983).
Hl7 In this case, the trial court specifically found that Childs
"brought her action believing that she was legally entitled to
some of [Callahan's] military retirement benefits." The trial
court also stated that Childs "honestly felt the facts [in this
case] were substantially distinguishable from the Toone case."
Callahan does not dispute these factual findings and therefore,
we accept them as true. See C & Y Corp. v. General Biometrics,
Inc.. 896 P.2d 47, 52 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("Because appellants
do not challenge the trial court's factual findings, we must
accept . . . [them] as true.").
Ul8 Furthermore, the record does not support a finding that
Childs pursued her claim to hinder, delay, defraud, or take
unconscionable advantage of Callahan. See Cady, 671 P.2d at 151
(holding ill-formed belief in claim does not prove bad faith).
We hold that Childs•s claim was not asserted in bad faith and
Callahan is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal as a result,
1. Having not filed a cross appeal on the denial of attorney
fees below, Appellee has not properly presented the issue here.
However, the denial of fees below supplies the basis for the
denial of fees on appeal. As a result, we review the action of
the trial court regarding attorney fees for that limited purpose
only.

99nne;i -ra

and also "because attorney fees were not awarded below."
v. 3aker, 866 P.2d 540, 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Baker

CONCLUSION
^19 Because a change in law does not constitute a substantial
change of circumstances and because Childs has failed to
demonstrate a substantial change of circumstances factually, we
conclude the trial court did not err in refusing to reopen the
issue of Callahan's military retirement benefits. Also, we hold
that Childsfs claim was not asserted in bad faith and therefore,
refuse to award Callahan attorney fees incurred at trial and on
appeal.
12 0

Affirmed.

Michael J. Wilkins,
Presiding Judge
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WE CONCUR:

990051-CA
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APPF.NTITY A

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of December, 1999, a true
and correct copy of the attached OPINION was deposited in the
United States mail to:
NEIL 3. CRIST
LEONARD S. MCGEE
NEIL CRIST & ASSOCIATES
380 N 200 W #260
BOUNTIFUL UT 84010
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
COHNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 E 100 S STE 500
?0 BOX 11008
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84147-0008
and a true and correct copy of the attached OPINION was deposited
in the United States mail to the judge listed below:
Honorable ROGER S. DUTSON
SECOND DISTRICT, OGDEN DEPT
2525 GRANT AVE
OGDEN UT 844 01

Judicial Secretary
TRIAL COURT: SECOND DISTRICT, OGDEN DEPT , 820980786
APPEALS CASE NO.: 990051-CA

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTA#>
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT
^
^

^ o

DIANA CHTLDS
fka Diane Callahan,

v>

RULING
Plaintiff,
Case No. 820980786 DA
Honorable Roger S. Dutson

vs.

v

WILLIAM K. CALLAHAN,
Defendant.

This case is before the court for the purpose of determining whether or not Respondent
should be awarded attorneys fees pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-27-56 in an action brought
by Petitioner to have the court amend a decree of divorce by awarding a share of post-divorce
perfected military retirement. Also, because this is a domestic action, equitable principles could be
considered in reviewing attorneys fees but because of the courts decision herein, that was not
necessary.
The court denied the Petitioners Motion to Amend the Decree of Divorce pursuant to the law,
including the recent case of Toone v Toone, 952 P.2d 112 (1998).
The parties were divorced in 1982. At that time the Respondent had completed about 13
years of active military service but was not then eligible for any retirement benefits. About two years
later in 1984, the Petitioner took Respondent back to court and obtained an increase in child support.
After the divorce the Respondent purportedly became involved in the military reserves and was
purportedly able to obtain or is in the process of obtaining retirement benefits by including the 13

$?.

Childs vs. Callahan
820980786 DA
Page Two

years of active military service while the parties were married. Subsequently the Petitioner became
aware that the federal law had changed regarding military benefits partially earned during a marriage
and her potential entitlement to some of those benefits and she sought counsel to attempt to obtain
what she felt was her portion of the retirement earned during the 13 year they were married and he
was on active duty.
The Utah Court of Appeals reviewed the laws regarding partially earned military retirements
in Toone, Ibid in its decision of January 29, 1998, and determined that the change in the laws did not
amount to a substantial change of circumstances which would justify reopening the divorce decree
in that case. This court ruled in it's decision dated December 18, 1998 that the law of Toone
controlled the facts of the present case and dismissed the Motion to Amend the Decree of Divorce
of 1982.
Petitioner argued that in addition to the change in law discussed in Toone, Ibid, there were
substantial evidentiary facts that showed a substantial change of circumstances. This court reviewed
those purported factual changes, construing them most favorably to Petitioner, and did not find any
material change of circumstances, even by including consideration of the changes in law jointly with
the other material facts that had occurred between 1982 and 1998. Therefore the court ruled that
there was not justification to reopen the retirement benefit issues.
The question now before the court is whether or not attorneys fees should be awarded
Respondent who asserts the law is so clear as to the issues raised by Petitioner that they amount to
the raising of issues that are "....without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith,..." (UCA

Childs vs. Callahan
820980786 DA
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78-27-56)
This courtfindsthat the claims of Petitioner are clearly without merit and that the legal issues
were clearly resolved by the Utah Court of Appeals decision in Toone, Ibid, issued on January 29,
1998, some 3 months before the present action was filed. It does not necessarily follow however, that
because the legal issues were without merit, the action was brought in "bad faith". This latter issue
requires consideration of additional factors because it is both a factual and legal issue.
Petitioner asserts that she was totally unaware of certain potential legal rights to military
retirement benefits she possessed until about January 1998 and then began searching for counsel who
could competently handle this issue. She asserts that the attorney representing her in the 1982
divorce advised her she had norightsto the 13 years potential retirement benefits as there was a U.S.
Supreme Court preventing her from any benefit therefrom. At the time of the divorce, he was not
serving in the active military nor military reserves. After contacting several attorneys unsuccessfully,
she hired Attorney Neil Crist who is a Retired Air Force Colonel who represented he knew about the
law regarding military retirement benefits as they relate to divorce cases. Prior to the hearing on
Respondents Motion to Dismiss, the Petitioner and her attorney went over the facts of Toone, Ibid
and concluded that the facts of that case were distinguishable from her case and therefore, they
concluded they wanted this court to make a decision in this matter. The court notes that it is apparent
that Petitioner was previously aware that Respondent was actively involved in the military reserves
as early as 1984 because at that time when she was getting the child support increased she issued a
subpoena to Respondent asking about his income, including his "...military reserve service." The

Childs vs. Callahan
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court furtherfindsthat it would not have been difficult for her to determine that the 13 years of active
military service during their marriage would have counted for any retirement benefits he might obtain
through additional reserve involvement and the court can take judicial notice of the law governing
that fact. However, it would have been more difficult for her to obtain information regarding and an
understanding of her legal right to claim any such retirement benefits.
For purposes of the record this court has carefully reviewed the evidence submitted by
Respondent concerning reasonable attorneys fees incurred by him and finds them to be reasonable.
Further, the court has not considered thefinancialpositions of either party as it relates to the ability
to pay attorneys fees nor any equitable factors relating thereto.
The court doesfindfromthe foregoing facts and a full review of the affidavits submitted in
this case that the Petitioner brought her action believing that she was legally entitled to some of the
military retirement benefits the Respondent could potentially receive. The court finds that she
honestly felt the facts were substantially distinguishable from the Toone case, even though the court
does not so find. On the other hand, because the present state of the law in Utah does clearly
preclude the claims presented, application of the clear rule of law to the facts of this case make it a
very close issue, though that issue is resolved in favor of Petitioner and attorneys fees are denied.
Of course, the appellate courts will be left to determine costs and attorneys fees on any appeal that
might be pursued.

Childs vs. Callahan
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DATED this Z > d a v of March, 1999.

LOGER S )UTSON
>ISTRI
COURT JUDGE

CERTTFTCATE QF MATLTNG
I HEREBY certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to the
following parties by first class mail, postage pre-paid, this |6ffi) day of March, 1999:
NEIL B. CRIST
Attorney for Petitioner
380 North 200 West
Suite 260
Bountiful, UT 84010
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Respondent
525 East 100 South
Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City. UT 84102

DEPUTY COURT CLERK

APPirismtY A

§1401

In subsection (a), the words "who are In the Retired
Reserve" are substituted for 50:927<a) (last 11 words),
since section 271 of this title prescribes the conditions
for being placed in the Retired Reserve. 50:927(b) (last
sentence) is omitted, since the revised section provides
that both lists be maintained.
In subsection (b). the words "containing the names
placed thereon under section 1202 or 1205 of this title"
are substituted for the words "upon which shall be
placed the names of all members of his service entitled
to such placement pursuant to the provisions of this
subchapter".
1958 ACT
Revised
tfCtlOfl

1376

Page 794

TITLE 10—ARMED FORCES

Source i U.S. Code)
(Uncodified].

Source (Statutes at
Laroel
July 24. 1956. ch. 677.
5 2 (less clauses (iMI).
as
applicable
to
10:1376). 70 Slat. 623.

AMENDMENTS

1994—Pub. L. 103-337 substituted "Temporary disability retired lists" for,f "Retired lists" as section
catchline. struck out "(b) before "The Secretary concerned", and struck out subsec. (a) which read as follows: "Under regulations prescribed by the SecreUry
concerned, there shall be maintained retired lists containing the names of the Reserves of the armed forces
under his Jurisdiction who are in the Retired Reserve." See section 12774 of this title.
1958—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 85-861 struck out provisions requiring publication of the temporary disability
retired list annually in the official register or other official publication of the armed force concerned.
EFFECTIVE DATE or 1994 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 103-337 effective Dec. 1,
1994, except as otherwise provided, see section 1691 of
Pub. L. 103-337. set out as an Effective Date note
under section 10001 of this title.

Sec.

1408.
1409.
1410.
1411.
1412.

Payment of retired or retainer pay in compliance with court orders.'
Retired pay multiplier.
Restoral of full retirement amount at age 62
for members entering on or after August 1.
1986.
Rules of construction.
Rounding to next lower dollar.
AMENDMENTS

1987-Pub. L. 100-26. 17(h)(2)(B). Apr. 21. 1987. 101
Stat. 282. substituted colon for semicolon and "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" for "Internal Revenue
Code of 1954" in item 1403.
1986—Pub. L. 99-348. title III. {304(b)(2). July 1.
1986. 100 Stat. 703. inserted "of members who first
became members before September 8. 1980" in item
1402. substituted "Retired pay base for members who
first became members before September 8. 1980: final
basic pay" for "Limitations on revocation of retired
pay" in item 1406 and "Retired pay base for members
who first became members after September 7. 1980:
high-36 month average" for "Retired pay base" in
item 1407. and added items 1409 to 1412.
1982—Pub. L. 97-252. title X. 11002(b). Sept. 8. 1982.
96 Stat. 735. added item 1408.
1980—Pub. L. 96-513. title V. J51K51XC). (52)(C).
Dec. 12. 1980. 94 Stat. 2924. 2925. substituted "of members who first became members after September 7.
1980" for "in case of members who first became members after the enactment of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1981" in item 1402a. and substituted "Internal Revenue Code of 1954" for "title
26" in item 1403.
Pub. L. 96-342. title VIII. § 813(a)(2). (b)(3)(B). 94
Stat. 1101.1104. added Items 1402a and 1407.
1966-Pub. L. 89-718. $ 3. Nov. 2. 1966. 80 Stat. 1115.
substituted "8301" for "47a" in item 1404.
Pub. L. 89-652. § 2(2). Oct. 14. 1966. 80 Stat. 902.
added item 1406.
1963—Pub. L. 88-132. f 5(g)(2). Oct. 2. 1963. 77 Stat.
214. added item 1401a.
1958—Pub. L. 85-422. 5 11(a)(1)(B). May 20. 1958. 72
Stat. 131. added item 1405.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

CROSS REFERENCES

This section is referred to in section 1431 of this
title; title 33 section 857a: title 42 section 213a.

Length of service retirement, computation of retired
pay. see section 1315 of this title.
Physical disability retirement or separation, computation of retired pay. see section 1275 of this title.
Transfer to inactive status list instead of separation.
see section 1209 of this title.

CHAPTER 71—COMPUTATION OF RETIRED PAY
Sec.

1401.
1401a.
1402.

1402a.

1403.
1404.
1405.
1406.
1407.

Computation of retired pay.
Adjustment of retired pay and retainer pay
to reflect changes in Consumer Price
Index.
Recomputation of retired or retainer pay to
reflect later active duty of members who
first became members before September 8.
1980.
Recomputation of retired or retainer pay to
reflect later active duty of members who
first became members after September 7.
1980.
Disability retired pay: treatment under Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
Applicability of section 8301 of title 5.
Years of service.
Retired pay base for members who first
became members before September 8. 1980:
final basic pay.
Retired pay base for members who first
became members after September 7. 1980:
high-36 month average.

CHAPTER REPERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This chapter is referred to in sections 642. 1209.
1275. 1315 of this title; title 33 section 857a: title 42
section 213a.
S 1401. Computation of retired pay
(a)

DISABILITY. NON-REGULAR SERVICE, WAR-

RANT OFFICER, AND DOPMA RETIREMENT.—The

monthly retired pay of a person entitled thereto under this subtitle is computed according to
the following table. For each case covered by a
section of this title named in the column
headed "For sections", retired pay is computed
by taking, in order, the steps prescribed opposite it in columns 1, 2, 3, and 4, as modified by
the applicable footnotes.
' Section catchline amended by Pub. L. 102-190 without corresponding amendment of chapter analysis.
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*or- 1 For
"Jula 1 sec_No. j tions 1

Take

j

Multiply by

1

Add

1

Column 4

I

Subtract

1201
1204

Retired pay base as computed j As member elects—
under section 1406(b) or 1407.
(1) 2'/.% of years of s e n Ice credited to him under
section 1208:' or
(2) the percentage of disability on date when retired.

2

1202
1205

elects—
Retired pay base as computed As member
\ Amount necessary to Excess over 75% of
under section 1406(b) or 1407.
(1) 2%h% of years of servretired pay base
Increase product of
ice credited to him under
upon which
columns 1 and 2 to
section 1208:' or
computation is
50% of retired pay
(2) the percentage of disbased.
base
upon
which
ability on date when his
computation
is
name was placed on tempobased.
rary disability retired list.

4

560 Retired pay base as computed The retired pay multiplier
1263
under section 1406(b) or 1407. prescribed
in
section
1293 j
1409(a) for t h e yemrs of
1305
service credited t o him
under section 1405.

5

633
634
635
636
1251

j Excess over 75% of
1 retired pay base
upon which
computation is
1 based

Retired pay base as computed The retired pay multiplier
under section 1406(b) or 1407. prescribed
in
section
1409(a) for t h e ye*rs of
service credited to him
under section 1405.

/
~*2J**lOT? *PP |y i n « Percentale factor, credit each full month of service that Is in addition to the number of full years of service
creqitable to the member as one-twelfth of a year and disregard any remaining fractional part of a month.
-(b) U S E OF MOST FAVORABLE FORMULA.—If a
person would otherwise be entitled to retired
pay computed under more than one formula of
the table in subsection (a) or of any other provision of law, the person is entitled to be paid
under the applicable formula that is most favorable to him.
(Aug. 10. 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 106; May 20,
1958, Pub. L. 85-422. §§6(7), 11(a)(2), 72 Stat.
129, 131; Oct. 2, 1963. Pub. L. 88-132. § 5(h)(1).
77 Stat. 214: Aug. 21. 1965. Pub. L. 89-132. § 6.
79 Stat. 547; Dec. 16. 1967. Pub. L. 90-207.
§ 3(1), 81 Stat. 653; Oct. 2. 1972, Pub. L. 92-455.
§ 1. 86 Stat. 761; Sept. 8. 1980. Pub. L. 96-342.
title VIII. § 813(b)(1). 94 Stat. 1102: Dec. 12.
1980. Pub. L. 96-513. title I. § 113(a), title V.
§511(49). 94 Stat. 2876. 2924; Sept. 24. 1983.
Pub. L. 98-94. title IX, §§ 922(a)(1). 923(a)(1).
(2)(A), 97 Stat. 641. 642; Oct. 30. 1984. Pub. L.
98-S57. § 35(b). 98 Stat. 2877; July 1. 1986. Pub.
L. 99-348. title II. § 201(a). 100 Stat. 691: Oct.
23. 1992. Pub. L. 102-484. div. A. title X.
§ 1052(18). 106 Stat. 2500; Oct. 5, 1994, Pub. L.
103-337. div. A. title XVI. § 1662(j)(2). 108 Stat.
300*.)

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES
Revised
section

Source (U.S. Code)

Source (Statutes at
Large)

1401
10:6001(0 (1st sentence, June 29. 1948. ch. 708.
1303 (1st 91 words
less applicability to re• Introand 1st proviso). 62
tired trade).
due.
Stat. 1088.
34:430(f) (1st sentence,
torv
less applicability to re- Oct. 12. 1949. ch. 681.
clatue.
| | 402(d) (less 30th
tired grade).
through 55th words:
1401(1)..... 37:272(d) (less 1st 55
less 104th through
words:
less
104th
128th words, as applithrough 128th words,
cable to retired grade:
as applicable to reand less 2d. 5th. and
tired grade: and less
1st. 2d. 4th. 5th. and last provisos). 402(e)
(1st proviso of last
last provisos).
sentence). 63 Sut.
37.272(e) (1st proviso ot

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES—Continued
Revise?
section

Source (U.S. Code)

Soura* (Statutes at
Large)

1401(2) . w . 37:272(d) (1st 29. andMay 29. 1954. ch. 249.
51st through 55th.
1 14(d) (less 1st senwords, and 4th provitence), (f) (1st senso).
tence, less applicabil1401(3) . ^ 10:1036b (1st 91 words
ity to retired grade:
and 1st proviso).
and last sentence). 68
34:440J (1st 91 words
Stat. 163. 164.
and 1st proviso).
1401(4) .„... 10:600/(d) (2d sentence).
10:600f(f)
(last
sentence).
34:430(d) (2d sentence)
34:430(f) (last sentence).
1401.
(No source].
footnote 1.
1401.
(No source!.
footnote 2.
1401.
j 37:272(d) (1st proviso):
foot10:800/(d) (less 1st and
2d sentences).
note 3.
34:430(d) (less 1st and
2d sentences).
In the Introductory paragraph, the applicability of
the mi* suted in the third sentence to situations not
expressly covered by the laws named in the source
statutes above is a practical construction that the rule
must be reciprocally applied in all cases.
In formula No. 1. the words "whichever is earlier",
in 37:2?2(d) (clause (2)). are omitted, since they are
contrary to the rule stated in 37:272(e) (1st proviso of
last sentence).
In formula No. 3. the computation is based on
monthly pay instead of annuaJ pay to conform to the
other formulas of the revised section. The words
"basic pay" are substituted for the words "base and
longevity pay" to conform to the terminology of the
Career Compensation Act of 1949 (37 U.S.C. 231 et
seq.). The words "which he would receive if serving, at
the time granted such pay. on active duty" are omitted as surplusage and to conform to the other formulas of the revised section, since the effect of these
words bs covered by footnote I.'The words "at any
time" are substituted for the words "during his entire
period of service".
Footnotes 1 and 2 reflect the long-standing construe-
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REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 1331 of this title, referred to in subsecs.
(c)'l) and (d)(1). was renumbered section 12731 of this
title and amended generally by Pub. L. 103-337. div. A.
title XVI. §1662(j)(l). Oct. 5. 1994. 108 Stat. 2998.
2999. A new section 1331 was added by section
1662(j)(7) of Pub. L. 103-337.
Chapter 67 o! this titte. referred to in subsec. idxi >.
was transferred to part II of subtitle £ of this title, renumbered as chapter 1223. and amended generally by
Pub. L. 103-337. div. A. title XVI. § 1662(j)(l). Oct. 5.
1994. 108 Stat. 2998. A new chapter 67 <§ 1331) of this
title was added by section 1662(j)(7) of Pub. L.
103-337.
PRIOR PROVISIONS

A prior section 1407. added Pub. L. 96-342. title VIII.
i 813(a)(1). Sept. 8. 1980. 94 Stat. 1100: amended Pub.
L. 96-513. title I. $ 113(c). title V. H 501(21). 511(53).
Dec. 12. 1980. 94 Stat. 2877. 2908. 2925. related to determination of retired base pay. prior to repeal by
Pub. L. 99-348. § 104(b).
AMENDMENTS

1994—Subsec.
(c)(2)(B).
Pub.
L.
103-337.
§ 1662(j)(5)(A). which directed substitution of "chapter 1223" for "chapter 67". could not be executed because the words "chapter 67" did not appear subsequent to amendment by Pub. L. 101-189. § 651(a)(2).
(4). See 1989 Amendment note below.
Subsec. (f)(2). Pub. L. 103-337. § 1662(j)(5)(B). which
directed amendment of subsec. (f)(2) by substituting
"Chapter 1223" for "Chapter 67" in heading and "section 12731" for "section 1331" in text, could not be executed because of previous repeal of subsec. (f) by
Pub. L. 101-189. § 651(a)(2). See 1989 Amendment note
be)t>w.
1989—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 101-189. § 651(a)(1). (b)(2).
substituted "person" for "member", "person's" for
"member's", and "subsection (c) or (d)" for "subsection (c)".
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 101-189. § 651(a)(2). (4). added
subsec. (c) and struck out former subsec. (c) which related to computation of high-three average.
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 101-189. 1651(a)(4). added
subsec. (d). Former subsec. (d) redesignated (e).
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 101-189. | 651(a)(2). (3). redesignated subsec. (d) as (e) and struck out former subsec.
(e) which related to special rules for short-term disability retirees.
Subsecs. (f). (g). Pub. L. 101-189. | 651(a)(2). struck
out subsec. (f) which related to special rule for members retiring with non-regular service, and subsec. (g)
which defined the term "years of creditable service".
EFFECTIVE DATE or

1994

AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 103-337 effective Dec. 1.
1994, except ms otherwise provided, see section 1691 of
Pub. L. 103-337. set out as an Effective Date note
under section 10001 of this title.
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in sections 1401. 1402a.
3991. 3992. 6151. 6333. 6334. 8991. 8992. 12739 of this
title: title 14 sections 357. 423. 424; title 33 section
853o: title 42 sections 211. 212.
§ 1408. Payment of retired or retainer pay in compliance with court orders

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: %
(1) The term "court" means—
(A) any court of competent jurisdiction of
any State, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam.
American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the
Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands;

r^rtur^o
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(B) any court of the United States (as defined in section 451 of title 28) having conn
petent jurisdiction: and
(C) any court of competent jurisdiction of
a foreign country with which the United
States has an agreement requiring the
United States to honor any court order of
such country.
(2) The term "court order" means a final
decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or
legal separation issued by a court, or a court
ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement incident to such a decree (including a;
final decree modifying the terms of a previously issued decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation, or a court ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement incident to such previously issued
decree), which—
(A) is issued in accordance with the laws
of the jurisdiction of that court;
(B) provides for—
(i) payment of child support (as defined
in section 462(b) of the Social Security
Act (42 U.S.C. 662(b)));
(ii) payment of alimony (as defined in
section 462(c) of the Social Security Act
(42 U.S.C. 662(c))); or
(iii) division of property (including a division of community property); and
(C) in the case of a division of property,
specifically provides for the payment of an
amount, expressed in dollars or as a percentage of disposable retired pay. from the
disposable retired pay of a member to the
spouse or former spouse of that member.
(3) The term "final decree" means a decree
from which no appeal may be taken or from
which no appeal has been taken within the
time allowed for taking such appeals under
the laws applicable to such appeals, or a
decree from which timely appeal has been
taken and such appeal has been finally decided under the laws applicable to such appeals.
(4) The term "disposable retired pay"
means the total monthly retired pay to which
alhember is entitled less amounts which—
(A) are owed by that member to the
United States for previous overpayments of
retired pay and for recoupments required
by law resulting from entitlement to retired
pay;
(B) are deducted from the retired pay of
such member as a result of forfeitures of retired pay ordered by a court-martial or as a
result of a waiver of retired pay required by
law in order to receive compensation under
title 5 or title 38;
(C) in the case of a member entitled to retired pay under chapter 61 of this title, are
equal to the amount of retired pay of the
member under that chapter computed using
the percentage of the member's disability
on the date when the member was retired
(or the date on which the member's name
was placed on the temporary disability retired list); or
(D) are deducted because of an election
under chapter 73 of this title to provide an
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annuity to a spouse or former spouse to
whom payment of a portion of such member's retired pay is being made pursuant to
a court order under this section.
(5) The term "member" includes a former
member entitled to retired pay under section
1331 * of this title.
(6) The term "spouse or former spouse"
means the husband or wife, or former husband or wife, respectively, of a member who.
on or before the date of a court order, was
married to that member.
(7) The term "retired pay" includes retainer
pay.
(b) EFFECTIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS —For the
purposes of this section—
(1) service of a court order is effective if—
(A) an appropriate agent of the Secretary
concerned designated for receipt of service
of court orders under regulations prescribed
pursuant to subsection (D or. i f no agent
has been so designated, the Secretary concerned, is personally served or is served by
certified or registered mail, return receipt
requested,
(B) the court order is regular on its face;
(C) the court order or other documents
served with the court order identify the
member concerned and include, if possible,
the social security number of such member;
and
(D) the court order or other documents
served with the court order certify that the
rights of the member under the Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50
U.S.C. App. 501 et seq.) were observed; and
(2) a court order is regular on its face if the
order—
(A) is issued by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(B) is legal in form; and
(C) includes nothing on its face that provides reasonable notice that it is issued
without authority of law.
(c) AUTHORITY FOR COURT TO TREAT RETIRED
PAY AS PROPERTY OF THE MEMBER AND SPOUSE.—

(1) Subject to the limitations of this section, a
court may treat disposable retired pay payable
to a member for pay periods beginning after
June 25. 1981, either as property solely of the
member or as property of the member and his
spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court. A court may not treat retired pay as property in any proceeding to
divide or partition any amount of retired pay of
a member as the property of the member and
the member's spouse or former spouse if a final
decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or
legal separation (including a court ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement incident
to such decree) affecting the member and the
member's spouse or former spouse (A) was
issued before June 25. 1981. and (B) did not
treat (or reserve jurisdiction to treat) any
amount of retired pay of the member as property of the member and the member's spouse or
former spouse

§1408

(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of
law. this section does not create any right, title,
or interest which can be sold, assigned, transferred, or otherwise disposed of (including by
inheritance) by a spouse or former spouse Payments by the Secretary concerned under subsection (d) to a spouse or former spouse with respect to a division of retired pay as the property of a member and the member's spouse under
this subsection may not be treated as amounts
received as retired pay for service in the uni-r
formed services.
**
(3) This section does not authorize any court
to order a member to apply for retirement or
retire at a particular time m order to effectuate
any payment under this section
(4) A court may not treat the disposable retired pay of a member in the manner described
in paragraph (1) unless the court has jurisdiction over the member by reason of (A) his residence, other than because of military assignment, in the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
(B) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction of
the court, or (C) his consent to the jurisdiction
of the court.
(d) PAYMENTS BY SECRETARY CONCERNED TO
SPOUSE OR FORMER SPOUSE.—(1) After effective

service on the Secretary concerned of a court
order providing for the payment of child support or alimony or, with respect to a division of
property, specifically providing for the payment of an amount of the disposable retired
pay from a member to the spouse or a former
spouse of the member, the Secretary shall
make payments (subject to the limitations of
this section) from the disposable retired pay of
the member to the spouse or former spouse in
an amount sufficient to satisfy the amount of
child support and alimony set forth in the
court order and, with respect to a division of
property, in the amount of disposable retired
pay specifically provided for in the court order
In the case of a member entitled to receive retired pay on the date of the effective service of
the court order, such payments shall begin not
later than 90 days after the date of effective
service. In the case of a member not entitled to
receive retired pay on the date of the effective
service of the court order, such payments shall
begin not later than 90 days after the date on
which the member first becomes entitled to receive retired pay
(2) If the spouse or former spouse to whom
payments are to be made under this section was
not married to the member for a period of 10
years or more during which the member performed at least 10 years of service creditable in
determining the member's eligibility for retired
pay. payments may not be made under this section to the extent that they include an amount
resulting from the treatment by the court
under subsection (c) of disposable retired pay of
the member as property of the member or
property of the member and his spouse
(3) Payments under this section shall not be
made mere frequently than once each month,
and the Secretary concerned shall not be required to vary normal pay and disbursement
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(4) Payments from the disposable retired pay
of a member pursuant to this section shall terminate in accordance with the terms of the applicable court order, but not later than the date
of the death of the member or the date of the
death of the spouse or former spouse to whom
payments are being made, whichever occurs
first.
(5) If a court order described in paragraph (1)
provides for a division of property (including a
division of community property) in addition to
an amount of child support or alimony or the
payment of an amount of disposable retired
pay as the result of the courts treatment of
such pay under subsection (c) as property of
the member and his spouse, the Secretary concerned shall pay (subject to the limitations of
this section) from the disposable retired pay of
the member to the spouse or former spouse of
the member, any part of the amount payable to
the spouse or former spouse under the division
of property upon effective service of a final
court order of garnishment of such amount
from such retired pay.
(e) LIMITATIONS.—(1) The total amount of the
disposable retired pay of a member payable
under all court orders pursuant to subsection
iO may not exceed 50 percent of such disposable retired pay.
(2) In the event of effective service of more
Lhan one court order which provide for payment to a spouse and one or more former
spouses or to more than one former spouse, the
iisposable retired pay of the member shall be
jsed to satisfy (subject to the limitations of
paragraph (I)) such court orders on a firstjome, first-served basis. Such court orders shall
>e satisfied (subject to the limitations of paragraph (D) out of that amount of disposable reired pay which remains after the satisfaction
>f all court orders which have been previously
served.
(3)(A) In the event of effective service of conlicting court orders under this section which
ssert to direct that different amounts be paid
luring a month to the same spouse or former
pouse of the same member, the Secretary conerned shall—
(i) pay to that spouse from the member's
disposable retired pay the least amount directed to be paid during that month by any
such conflicting court order, but not more
than the amount of disposable retired pay
which remains available for payment of such
court orders based on when such court orders
were effectively served and the limitations of
paragraph (I) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4);
(ilLretain an amount of disposable retired
piy Burf is equal to the lesser of—
(I) the difference between the largest
amount required by any conflicting court
order to be paid to the spouse or former
spouse and the amount payable to the
spouse or former spouse under clause (i);%
and
(II) the amount of disposable retired pay
which remains available for payment of any
conflicting court order based on when such
court order was effectively served and the
limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4); and

•*«.<,
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(iii) pay to that member the amount which
is equal to the amount of that member's disposable retired pay (less any amount paid
during such month pursuant to legal process
served under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) and any amount paid
during such month pursuant to court orders
effectively served under this section, other
than such conflicting court orders) minus—
(I) the amount of disposable retired pay
paid under clause (i): and
(II) the amount of disposable retired pay
retained under clause (ii).
(B) The Secretary concerned shall hold the
amount retained under clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) until such time as that Secretary is
provided with a court order which has been certified by the member and the spouse or former
spouse to be valid and applicable to the retained amount. Upon being provided with such
an order, the Secretary shall pay the retained
amount in accordance with the order.
(4)(A) In the event of effective service of a
court order under this section and the service
of legal process pursuant to section 459 of the
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659). both of
which provide for payments during a month
from the same member, satisfaction of such
court orders and legal process from the retired
pay of the member shall be on a first-come,
first-served basis. Such court orders and legal
process shall be satisfied out of moneys which
are subject to such orders and legal process and
which remain available in accordance with the
limitations of paragraph (I) and subparagraph
(B) of this paragraph during such month after
the satisfaction of all court orders or legal process which have been previously served.
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the total amount of the disposable retired
pay of a member payable by the Secretary concerned under all court orders pursuant to this
section and all legal processes pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
659) with respect to a member may not exceed
65 percent of the amount of the retired pay
payable to such member that is considered
under section 462 of the Social Security Act (42
UJS.C. 662) to be remuneration for employment
that is payable by the United States.
(5) A court order which itself or because of
previously served court orders provides for the
payment of an amount which exceeds the
amount of disposable retired pay available for
payment because of the limit set forth in paragraph (1), or which, because of previously
served court orders or legal process previously
served under section 459 of the Social Security
Act (42 U.S.C. 659), provides for payment of an
amount that exceeds the maximum amount
permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph
(B) of paragraph (4), shall not be considered to
be irregular on its face solely for that reason.
However, such order shall be considered to be
fully satisfied for purposes of this section by
the payment to the spouse or former spouse of
the maximum amount of disposable retired pay
permitted under paragraph (I) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4).
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(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed
to relieve a member of liability for the payment
of alimony, child support, or other payments
required by a court order on the grounds that
payments made out of disposable retired pay
under this section have been made in the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). Any such
unsatisfied obligation of a member may be enforced by any means available under law other
than the means provided under this section in
any case in which the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) has been paid and
under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. 659) in any case in which the maximum
amount permitted under subparagraph (B) of
paragraph (4) has been paid.
(f) IMMUNITY OF OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF

UNITED STATES.—(1) The United States and any

officer or employee of the United States shall
not be liable with respect to any payment made
from retired pay to any member, spouse, or
former spouse pursuant to a court order that is
regular on its face if such payment is made in
accordance with this section and the regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (i).
(2) An officer or employee of the United
States who. under regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (i). has the duty to respond to
interrogatories shall not be subject under any
law to any disciplinary action or civil or criminal liability or penalty for. or because of. any
disclosure of information made by him in carrying out any of his duties which directly or indirectly pertain to answering such interrogatories.
(g) NOTICE To MEMBER OF SERVICE OF COURT
ORDER ON SECRETARY CONCERNED.—A person re-

ceiving effective service of a court order under
this section shall, as soon as possible, but not
later than 30 days after the date on which effective service is made, send a written notice of
such court order (together with a copy of such
order) to the member affected by the court
order at his last known address.
(h) BENEFITS FOR DEPENDENTS WHO ARE VICTIMS OF ABUSE BY MEMBERS LOSING RIGHT TO
RETIRED PAY.—(1) If. in the case of a member or

former member of the armed forces referred to
in paragraph (2)(A). a court order provides (in
the manner applicable to a division of property)
for the payment of an amount from the disposable retired pay of that member or former
member (as certified under paragraph (4)) to
an eligible spouse or former spouse of that
member or former member, the Secretary concerned, beginning upon effective service of such
court order, shall pay that amount in accordance with this subsection to such spouse or
former spouse.
(2) A spouse or former spouse of a member or
former member of the armed forces is eligible
to receive payment under this subsection if—
(A) the member or former member, while a
member of the armed forces and after becoming eligible to be retired from the armed
forces on the basis of years of service, has eligibility to receive retired pay terminated as a
result of misconduct while a member involving flhilC* /if 0 cnftne* t%~ #4^^*— *J__» _ft-u~i /
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retary of Defense or. for the Coast Guard
when it is not operating as a service in the
Navy, by the Secretary of Transportation):
and
(B) the spouse or former spouse—
(i) was the victim of the abuse and was
married to the member or former member
at the time of that abuse; or
(ii) is a natural or adopted parent of a dependent child of the member or former
member who was the victim of the 2b«!fG***
(3) The amount certified by the Secretary
concerned under paragraph (4) with respect to
a member or former member of the armed
forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) shall be
deemed to be the disposable retired pay of that
member or former member for the purposes of
this subsection.
(4) Upon the request of a court or an eligible
spouse or former spouse of a member or former
member of the armed forces referred to in
paragraph (2)(A) in connection with a civil
action for the issuance of a court order in the
case of that member or former member, the
Secretary concerned shall determine and certify the amount of the monthly retired pay that
the member or former member would have
been entitled to receive as of the date of the
certification—
(A) if the member or former member's eligibility for retired pay had not been terminated
as described in paragraph (2XA); and
(B) if. in the case of a member or former
member not in receipt of retired pay immediately before that termination of eligibility for
retired pay. the member or former member
had retired on the effective date of that termination of eligibility.
(5) A court order under this subsection may
provide that whenever retired pay is increased
under section 1401a of this title (or any other
provision of law), the amount payable under
the court order to the spouse or former spouse
of a member or former member described in
paragraph (2)(A) shall be increased at the same
time by the percent by which the retired pay of
the member or former member would have
been increased if the member or former
member were receiving retired pay.
(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of
law. a member or former member of the armed
forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) shall
have no ownership interest in. or claim against,
any amount payable under this section to a
spouse or former spouse of the member or
former member.
(7)(A) If a former spouse receiving payments
under this subsection with respect to a member
or former member referred to in paragraph
(2)(A) marries again after such payments begin,
the eligibility of the former spouse to receive
further payments under this subsection shall
terminate on the date of such marriage.
(B) A person's eligibility to receive payments
under this subsection that is terminated under
subparagraph (A) by reason of remarriage shall
be resumed in the event of the termination of
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sumption of payments shall begin as of the first
day of the month in which that marriage is so
terminated. The monthly amount of the payments shall be the amount that would have
been paid if the continuity of the payments
had not been interrupted by the marriage.
(8) Payments in accordance with this subsection shall be made out of funds in the Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund established by section 1461 of this title or. in the
case of the Coast Guard, out of funds appropriated to the Department of Transportation for
payment of retired pay for the Coast Guard.
OKA) A spouse or former spouse of a member
or former member of the armed forces referred
to in paragraph (2HA), while receiving payments in accordance with this subsection, shall
be entitled to receive medical and dental care,
to use commissary and exchange stores, and to
receive any other benefit that a spouse or a
former spouse of a retired member of the
armed forces is entitled to receive on the basis
of being a spouse or former spouse, as the case
may be, of a retired member of the armed
forces in the same manner as if the member or
former member referred to in paragraph (2)(A)
was entitled to retired pay.
(B) A dependent child of a member or former
member referred to in paragraph (2)(A) who
was a member of the household of the member
or former member at the time of the misconduct described in paragraph (2)(A) shall be entitled to receive medical and dental care, to use
commissary and exchange stores, and to have
other benefits provided to dependents of retired members of the armed forces in the same
manner as if the member or former member referred to in paragraph (2)(A) was entitled to retired pay.
(C) If a spouse or former spouse or a dependent child eligible or entitled to receive a particular benefit under this paragraph is eligible
or entitled to receive that benefit under another provision of law, the eligibility or entitlement of that spouse or former spouse or dependent child to such benefit shall be determined under such other provision of law instead of this paragraph.
(10XA) For purposes of this subsection, in the
case of a member of the armed forces who has
been sentenced by a court-martial to receive a
punishment that will terminate the eligibility
of that member to receive retired pay if executed, the eligibility of that member to receive retired pay may, as determined by the Secretary
concerned, be considered terminated effective
upon the approval of that sentence by the
pereorf^Kfttt&ninder section 860(c) of this title
(article 60(c) of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice).
(B) If each form of the punishment that
would result in the termination of eligibility to
receive retired pay is later remitted, set aside,
or mitigated to a punishment that does not
result in the termination of that eligibility, a
payment of benefits to the eligible recipient
under this subsection that is based on the punishment so vacated, set aside, or mitigated shall
cease. The cessation of payments shall be effective as of the first day of the first month following the month in which the Secretary con-
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cerned notifies the recipient of such benefits in
writing that payment of the benefits will cease.
The recipient may not be required to repay the
benefits received before that effective date
(except to the extent necessary to recoup any
amount that was erroneous when paid).
(11) In this subsection, the term "dependent
child", with respect to a member or former
member of the armed forces referred to in
paragraph (2)(A). means an unmarried legitimate child, including an adopted child or a
stepchild of the member or former member,
who—
(A) is under 18 years of age:
(B) is incapable of self-support because of a
mental or physical incapacity that existed
before becoming 18 years of age and is dependent on the member or former member
for over one-half of the child's support: or
(C) if enrolled in a full-time course of study
in an institution of higher education recognized by the Secretary of Defense for the
purposes of this subparagraph, is under 23
years of age and is dependent on the member
or former member for over one-half of the
child's support.
(i) REGULATIONS.—The Secretaries concerned
shall prescribe uniform regulations for the administration of this section.
(Added Pub. L. 97-252. title X. § 1002(a), Sept.
8. 1982. 96 Stat. 730: amended Pub. L. 98*525,
title VI. §643(a)-(d). Oct. 19. 1984, 98 Stat.
2547: Pub. L. 99-661. div. A. title VI, § 644(a).
Nov. 14. 1986. 100 Stat. 3887: Pub. L. 100-26,
§§ 3(3). 7(h)(1), Apr. 21. 1987. 101 Stat. 273. 282:
Pub. L. 101-189, div. A. title VI, § 653(a)(5). title
XVI. § 1622(e)(6), Nov. 29. 1989. 103 Stat. 1462.
1605: Pub. L. 101-510. div. A. title V.
§ 555(a)-(d). (f). (g). Nov. 5. 1990. 104 Stat. 1569.
1570: Pub. L. 102-190. div. A. title X,
! 1061(a)(7). Dec. 5, 1991, 105 Stat. 1472: Pub. L.
102-484. div. A. title VI. § 653(a). Oct. 23, 1992.
106 Stat. 2426: Pub. L. 103-160, div. A. title V.
§ 555(a). (b). title XI. § 1182(a)(2). Nov. 30. 1993.
107 Stat. 1666. 1771.)
REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 1331 of this title, referred to in subsec.
(a)(5). was renumbered section 12731 of this title and
amended generally by Pub. L. 103-337. div. A. title
XVI. f 1662(J)(1), Oct. 5. 1994. 108 Stat. 2998. 2999. A
new section 1331 was added by section 1662(J)(7) of
Pub. L. 103-337.
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act. referred
to in subsec. (b)(1)(D). is act Oct. 17. 1940. ch. 888. 54
Stat. 1178. as amended, which is classified to section
501 et seq. of the Appendix to Title 50. War and National Defense. For complete classification of this Act
to the Code, see section 501 of the Appendix to Title
50 and Tables.
AMENDMENTS

4993-Subsecs. (b)(1)(A). (f)(1). (2). Pub. L. 103-160.
11182(a)(2)(A). substituted "subsection (I)" for -subsection (h)".
Subsec. (h)(2)(A). Pub. L. 103-160. f 555(b)(1). inserted "or, for the Coast Guard when it is not operating as
a service in the Navy, by the Secretary of Transportation" after "Secretary of Defense".
Subsec. (h)(4)(B). Pub. L. 103-160. f 1182(a)(2)(B).
inserted "of" after "of that termination".
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liabilities and regarding the parties' separate,
current addresses; and
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(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these
orders; and

(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)

(d) provisions for income withholding in
accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11,
Recovery Services.
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30-3-5. Disposition of propertyMaintenance and health care of parties
and children—Division of debts—Court
to have continuing jurisdictionCustody and visitation—Determination
of alimony-Nonmeritorious petition for
modification

(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the
court may include in it equitable orders relating
to the children, property, debts or obligations,
and parties. The court shall include the
following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the
payment of reasonable and necessary medical
and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a
reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase
and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital,
and dental care insurance for the dependent
children;

(2) The court may include, in an order
determining child support, an order assigning
financial responsibility for all or a portion of
child care expenses incurred on behalf of the
dependent children, necessitated by the
employment or training of the custodial parent.
If the court determines that the circumstances
are appropriate and that the dependent children
would be adequately cared for, it may include
an order allowing the noncustodial parent to
provide child care for the dependent children,
necessitated by the employment or training of
the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to
make subsequent changes or new orders for the
custody of the children and their support,
maintenance, health, and dental care, and for
distribution of the property and obligations for
debts as is reasonable and necessary.
*8559 (4)(a) In determining visitation rights of
parents, grandparents, and other members of the
immediate family, the court shall consider the
best interest of the child.

(i) an order specifying which party is
responsible for the payment of joint debts,
obligations, or liabilities of the parties
contracted or incurred during marriage;

(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the
need for peace officer enforcement, the court
may include in an order establishing a visitation
schedule a provision, among other things,
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court
ordered visitation schedule entered under this
chapter.

(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify
respective creditors or obligees, regarding the
court's division of debts, obligations, or

(5) If a petition for modification of child
custody or visitation provisions of a court order
is made and denied, the court shall order the

(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
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petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees
expended by the prevailing party in that action,
if the court determines that the petition was
without merit and not asserted or defended
against in good faith.
(6) If a petition alleges substantial
noncompliance with a visitation order by a
parent, a grandparent, or other member of the
immediate family pursuant to Section
78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been
previously grahted by the court, the court may
award to the prevailing party costs, including
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by
the prevailing party because of the other party's
failure to provide or exercise court-ordered
visitation.
(7)(a) The court shall consider at least the
following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the
recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to
produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide
support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the
parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to
the standard of living, existing at the time of
separation, in determining alimony in
accordance with Subsection (a). However, the
court shall consider all relevant facts and
equitable principles and may, in its discretion,
base alimony on the standard of living that
existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short
duration, when no children have been conceived
or born during the marriage, the court may
consider the standard of living that existed at the
time of the marriage.
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(d) The court may, under appropriate
circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties'
respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves
on the threshold of a major change in the
income of one of the spouses due to the
collective efforts of both, that change shall be
considered in dividing the marital property and
in determining the amount of alimony. If one
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly
enhanced through the efforts of both spouses
during the marriage, the court may make a
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital
property and awarding alimony.
*8560 (f) In determining alimony when a
marriage of short duration dissolves, and no
children have been conceived or bom during the
marriage, the court may consider restoring each
party to the condition which existed at the time
of the marriage.
(g)(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to
make substantive changes and new orders
regarding alimony based on a substantial
material change in
circumstances not
foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue
a new order for alimony to address needs of the
recipient that did not exist at the time the decree
was entered, unless the court finds extenuating
circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any
subsequent spouse of the payor may not be
considered, except as provided in this
subsection.
(A) The court may consider the subsequent
spouse's financial ability to share living
expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a
subsequent spouse if the court finds that the
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payor's improper
consideration.

conduct

justifies

that

(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration
longer than the number of years that the
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to
termination of alimony, the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
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(9) Any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony that
the former spouse is cohabitating with another
person.
Amended by Laws 1994, c. 284; Laws 1995. c. 330. § 1.
eff May 1. 1995; Laws 1997. c. 232. § 4. eff. July 1. 1997.
HISTORICAL NOTES

(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically
provides otherwise, any order of the court that a
party pay alimony to a former spouse
automatically terminates upon the remarriage of
that former spouse. However, if the remarriage
is annulled and found to be void ab initio,
payment of alimony shall resume if the party
paying alimony is made a party to the action of
annulment and his rights are determined.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Section 2 of Laws 1995, c. 330 provides:
"It is not the intent of the Legislature that termination of
alimony based on cohabitation with another person in
accordance with Subsection 30-3-5(9), be interpreted in
any way to condone such a relationship for any purpose."
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